axiom scan security privacy

Engineering Community

Skill notes

Tool Use Is Mandatory

Run every Glob, Grep, and Read this prompt lists. Do not reason from training data instead of scanning. Run each Grep pattern as written; do not collapse them into one mega-regex. Run the Read verifications each section calls for. "Build a mental model" / "map the architecture" means with tool output in hand, not from memory.

Files to Scan

Include: /*.swift, /Info.plist, /PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy, /*.entitlements Skip: *Tests.swift, *Previews.swift, *Mock*, *Fixture*, *Stub*, */Pods/*, */Carthage/*, */.build/*, */DerivedData/*, */scratch/*, */docs/*, */.claude/*, */.claude-plugin/*

Step 1: Identify Privacy Manifest and Entitlements

Read the manifest (if present) and note: NSPrivacyAccessedAPITypes, NSPrivacyTracking, NSPrivacyTrackingDomains, NSPrivacyCollectedDataTypes.

Step 3: Map Auth, Storage, and Network Surface

Read 2-3 key files (AuthService, NetworkClient, any file importing Security) to understand: Where credentials/tokens originate (login flow, OAuth callback, API key) Where they're stored (Keychain, AppStorage, UserDefaults, in-memory) Where they travel (HTTPS, HTTP, custom headers, query params) Where they're logged (redacted? Logger privacy levels? print()?)

Output

Write a brief Security & Privacy Map (5-10 lines) summarizing: Privacy Manifest status (present / missing / partial — list declared categories) Credential storage pattern (Keychain / AppStorage / UserDefaults / mixed) Network surface (HTTPS-only / HTTP present / mixed) Logging discipline (Logger with privacy levels / print / mixed)

Fluxly profile Runtime and permissions are inferred by Fluxly static checks, not author declarations or runtime test results.
Domain
Engineering
Author-declared agents
No explicit declaration found; this is not inferred or tested compatibility
Static check
94 / 100 · heuristic scan, not runtime safety proof
Runtime evidence
Not run; no isolated runtime test evidence is currently recorded
Author / version / license
@CharlesWiltgen · MIT
Token usage
Lean
Setup complexity
Guided setup
External API key
Required · Vendor-specific
Operating systems
Unspecified (assume cross-platform)
Runtime requirements
No explicit requirements detected
Detected file/system behavior
  • Read-only
  • Write / modify
  • Env read
Network behavior
External requests
Install commands
None (reference only)

Heads up: Tool permissions are not declared; actual access depends on the runtime.

01
Phase 1: Map Security & Privacy Posture

Phase 1: Map Security & Privacy Posture

02
Step 1: Identify Privacy Manifest and Entitlements

Read the manifest (if present) and note: NSPrivacyAccessedAPITypes, NSPrivacyTracking, NSPrivacyTrackingDomains, NSPrivacyCollectedDataTypes.

03
Step 2: Identify Sensitive Data Handling

Step 2: Identify Sensitive Data Handling

04
Step 3: Map Auth, Storage, and Network Surface

Read 2-3 key files (AuthService, NetworkClient, any file importing Security) to understand: Where credentials/tokens originate (login flow, OAuth callback, API key) Where they're stored (Keychain, AppStorage, UserDefaults, in-memory) Where they travel (HTTPS, HTTP, custom headers, query params) Where they're logged (redacted? Logger privacy levels? print()?)

05
Phase 2: Detect Known Anti-Patterns

Run all 7 existing detection patterns. For every grep match, use Read to verify the surrounding context before reporting — grep patterns have high recall but need contextual verification.

06
Phase 3: Reason About Security & Privacy Completeness

Using the Security & Privacy Map from Phase 1 and your domain knowledge, check for what's *missing* — not just what's wrong. Question · What it detects · Why it matters Does every Required Reason API found in Phase 1 have a matching declaration in PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy with a valid reason code? · Partial manifest coverage · Apple rejects builds where one API is declared but others are used without declaration

07
Phase 4: Cross-Reference Findings

Bump severity for these combinations: Finding A · + Finding B · = Compound · Severity Hardcoded API key · HTTP endpoint · Key transmitted in cleartext to attacker-observable network · CRITICAL Insecure token storage (AppStorage) · No Keychain migration path · Every upgrade user still exposed; fix is incomplete · HIGH Missing Privacy Manifest · Required Reason API in use · Guaranteed App Store Connect rejection · CRITICAL

08
Phase 5: Security Posture Score

Scoring: HARDENED: 0 CRITICAL, 0 hardcoded credentials, Privacy Manifest complete, all tokens in Keychain with `.whenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly`, HTTPS everywhere, privacy-leveled logging, export compliance declared GAPS: No CRITICAL but HIGH issues present (partial manifest coverage, one HTTP endpoint for non-auth traffic, weak Keychain ACL, missing SSL pinning on payment endpoint) VULNERABLE: Any CRITICAL — hardcoded credentials / missing manifest / ATT without description / missing usage descriptions / tokens in plaintext + HTTP

Discussion

Powered by GitHub Discussions. Sign in with GitHub to comment, react, or subscribe.