algorand vulnerability scanner

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Skill notes

1. Purpose

Systematically scan Algorand smart contracts (TEAL and PyTeal) for platform-specific security vulnerabilities documented in Trail of Bits' "Not So Smart Contracts" database. This skill encodes 11 critical vulnerability patterns unique to Algorand's transaction model.

2. When to Use This Skill

Auditing Algorand smart contracts (stateful applications or smart signatures) Reviewing TEAL assembly or PyTeal code Pre-audit security assessment of Algorand projects Validating fixes for reported Algorand vulnerabilities Training team on Algorand-specific security patterns

File Extensions & Indicators

TEAL files: .teal PyTeal files: .py with PyTeal imports

Project Structure

approval_program.py / clear_program.py contract.teal / signature.teal References to Algorand SDK or Beaker framework

Tool Support

Tealer: Trail of Bits static analyzer for Algorand Installation: uv tool install tealer (ensure uv's tool bin dir is on PATH) Usage: tealer contract.teal --detect all

Fluxly profile Runtime and permissions are inferred by Fluxly static checks, not author declarations or runtime test results.
Domain
Other
Author-declared agents
No explicit declaration found; this is not inferred or tested compatibility
Static check
88 / 100 · heuristic scan, not runtime safety proof
Runtime evidence
Not run; no isolated runtime test evidence is currently recorded
Author / version / license
@trailofbits · no license declared
Token usage
Lean
Setup complexity
Plug-and-play
External API key
Not required
Operating systems
Unspecified (assume cross-platform)
Runtime requirements
Python
Detected file/system behavior
  • Read-only
  • Write / modify
Network behavior
Local-only
Install commands
None (reference only)

Heads up: Tool permissions are not declared; actual access depends on the runtime.

Output preview algorand-vulnerability-scanner.preview
# 5. Example Output

=== ALGORAND VULNERABILITY SCAN RESULTS ===

Project: my-algorand-dapp
Files Scanned: 3 (.teal, .py)
Vulnerabilities Found: 2

---

[CRITICAL] Rekeying Attack
File: contracts/approval.py:45
Pattern: Missing RekeyTo validation

Code:
    If(Txn.type_enum() == TxnType.Payment,
        Seq([
            # Missing: Assert(Txn.rekey_to() == Global.zero_address())
            App.globalPut(Bytes("balance"), balance + Txn.amount()),
            Approve()
        ])
    )

Issue: The contract doesn't validate the RekeyTo field, allowing attackers
to change account authorization and bypass restrictions.

Discussion

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