漏洞扫描器
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- 作者更新于 2026年8月24日 23:09
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- 静态检查
- 88 / 100 · 启发式扫描,不代表运行安全
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- 未执行;当前没有隔离运行测试证据
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- @trailofbits · 未声明许可证
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- 即装即用
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- 兼容的系统
- 未声明(默认跨平台)
- 运行环境要求
- Python
- 检测到的文件与系统行为
-
- 只读
- 允许写入 / 修改
- 网络行为
- 仅限本地
- 安装命令数
- 无(仅作为资料)
需要注意: 未声明工具权限范围;实际权限由运行环境决定。
=== ALGORAND VULNERABILITY SCAN RESULTS ===
Project: my-algorand-dapp
Files Scanned: 3 (.teal, .py)
Vulnerabilities Found: 2
---
[CRITICAL] Rekeying Attack
File: contracts/approval.py:45
Pattern: Missing RekeyTo validation
Code:
If(Txn.type_enum() == TxnType.Payment,
Seq([
# Missing: Assert(Txn.rekey_to() == Global.zero_address())
App.globalPut(Bytes("balance"), balance + Txn.amount()),
Approve()
])
)
Issue: The contract doesn't validate the RekeyTo field, allowing attackers
to change account authorization and bypass restrictions.
第 1 步:平台识别
确认文件扩展名(`.teal`、`.py`) 识别框架(PyTeal、Beaker、纯 TEAL) 确定合约类型(有状态应用程序与智能签名) 找到批准并清除状态程序
第三步:手动漏洞扫描
对于上述 11 个漏洞中的每一个: 搜索相关交易字段使用情况 验证验证逻辑是否存在 检查绕过条件 验证内部交易处理
步骤 4:交易字段验证矩阵
为使用的所有交易类型创建清单: 付款交易: [ ] RekeyTo 已验证 [ ] CloseRemainderTo 已验证 [ ] 费用已验证(如果是智能签名)
第五步:集团交易分析
对于原子事务组: 验证 `Global.group_size()` 检查 检查绝对索引与相对索引 检查重播保护(租用字段) 验证组中 ApplicationCalls 的 OnComplete 字段
第 6 步:访问控制审查
[ ] 创建者/管理员权限正确执行 [ ] 更新/删除操作受到保护 [ ] 敏感功能进行授权检查
# Algorand Vulnerability Scanner
## 1. Purpose
Systematically scan Algorand smart contracts (TEAL and PyTeal) for platform-specific security vulnerabilities documented in Trail of Bits' "Not So Smart Contracts" database. This skill encodes 11 critical vulnerability patterns unique to Algorand's transaction model.
## 2. When to Use This Skill
- Auditing Algorand smart contracts (stateful applications or smart signatures)
- Reviewing TEAL assembly or PyTeal code
- Pre-audit security assessment of Algorand projects
- Validating fixes for reported Algorand vulnerabilities
- Training team on Algorand-specific security patterns
## 3. Platform Detection
### File Extensions & Indicators
- **TEAL files**: `.teal`
- **PyTeal files**: `.py` with PyTeal imports
### Language/Framework Markers
```python
# PyTeal indicators
from pyteal import *
from algosdk import *
# Common patterns
Txn, Gtxn, Global, InnerTxnBuilder
OnComplete, ApplicationCall, TxnType
@router.method, @Subroutine
```
### Project Structure
- `approval_program.py` / `clear_program.py`
- `contract.teal` / `signature.teal`
- References to Algorand SDK or Beaker framework
### Tool Support
- **Tealer**: Trail of Bits static analyzer for Algorand
- Installation: `uv tool install tealer` (ensure uv's tool bin dir is on PATH)
- Usage: `tealer contract.teal --detect all`
---
## 4. How This Skill Works
When invoked, I will:
1. **Search your codebase** for TEAL/PyTeal files
2. **Analyze each file** for the 11 vulnerability patterns
3. **Report findings** with file references and severity
4. **Provide fixes** for each identified issue
5. **Run Tealer** (if installed) for automated detection
---
## 5. Example Output
When vulnerabilities are found, you'll get a report like this:
```
=== ALGORAND VULNERABILITY SCAN RESULTS ===
Project: my-algorand-dapp
Files Scanned: 3 (.teal, .py)
Vulnerabilities Found: 2
---
[CRITICAL] Rekeying Attack
File: contracts/approval.py:45
Pattern: Missing RekeyTo validation
Code:
If(Txn.type_enum() == TxnType.Payment,
Seq([
# Missing: Assert(Txn.rekey_to() == Global.zero_address())
App.globalPut(Bytes("balance"), balance + Txn.amount()),
Approve()
])
)
Issue: The contract doesn't validate the RekeyTo field, allowing attackers
to change account authorization and bypass restrictions.
```
---
## 6. Vulnerability Patterns (11 Patterns)
I check for 11 critical vulnerability patterns unique to Algorand. For detailed detection patterns, code examples, mitigations, and testing strategies, see [VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md](resources/VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md).
### Pattern Summary:
1. **Rekeying Vulnerability** ⚠️ CRITICAL - Unchecked RekeyTo field
2. **Missing Transaction Verification** ⚠️ CRITICAL - No GroupSize/GroupIndex checks
3. **Group Transaction Manipulation** ⚠️ HIGH - Unsafe group transaction handling
4. **Asset Clawback Risk** ⚠️ HIGH - Missing clawback address checks
5. **Application State Manipulation** ⚠️ MEDIUM - Unsafe global/local state updates
6. **Asset Opt-In Missing** ⚠️ HIGH - No asset opt-in validation
7. **Minimum Balance Violation** ⚠️ MEDIUM - Account below minimum balance
8. **Close Remainder To Check** ⚠️ HIGH - Unchecked CloseRemainderTo field
9. **Application Clear State** ⚠️ MEDIUM - Unsafe clear state program
10. **Atomic Transaction Ordering** ⚠️ HIGH - Assuming transaction order
11. **Logic Signature Reuse** ⚠️ HIGH - Logic sigs without uniqueness constraints
For complete vulnerability patterns with code examples, see [VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md](resources/VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md).
## 7. Scanning Workflow
### Step 1: Platform Identification
1. Confirm file extensions (`.teal`, `.py`)
2. Identify framework (PyTeal, Beaker, pure TEAL)
3. Determine contract type (stateful application vs smart signature)
4. Locate approval and clear state programs
### Step 2: Static Analysis with Tealer
```bash
# Run Tealer on contract
tealer contract.teal --detect all
# Or specific detectors
tealer contract.teal --detect unprotected-rekey,group-size-check,update-application-check
```
### Step 3: Manual Vulnerability Sweep
For each of the 11 vulnerabilities above:
1. Search for relevant transaction field usage
2. Verify validation logic exists
3. Check for bypass conditions
4. Validate inner transaction handling
### Step 4: Transaction Field Validation Matrix
Create checklist for all transaction types used:
**Payment Transactions**:
- [ ] RekeyTo validated
- [ ] CloseRemainderTo validated
- [ ] Fee validated (if smart signature)
**Asset Transfers**:
- [ ] Asset ID validated
- [ ] AssetCloseTo validated
- [ ] RekeyTo validated
**Application Calls**:
- [ ] OnComplete validated
- [ ] Access controls enforced
- [ ] Group size validated
**Inner Transactions**:
- [ ] Fee explicitly set to 0
- [ ] RekeyTo not user-controlled (Teal v6+)
- [ ] All fields validated
### Step 5: Group Transaction Analysis
For atomic transaction groups:
1. Validate `Global.group_size()` checks
2. Review absolute vs relative indexing
3. Check for replay protection (Lease field)
4. Verify OnComplete fields for ApplicationCalls in group
### Step 6: Access Control Review
- [ ] Creator/admin privileges properly enforced
- [ ] Update/delete operations protected
- [ ] Sensitive functions have authorization checks
---
## 8. Reporting Format
### Finding Template
````markdown
## [SEVERITY] Vulnerability Name (e.g., Missing RekeyTo Validation)
**Location**: `contract.teal:45-50` or `approval_program.py:withdraw()`
**Description**:
The contract approves payment transactions without validating the RekeyTo field, allowing an attacker to rekey the account and bypass future authorization checks.
**Vulnerable Code**:
```python
# approval_program.py, line 45
If(Txn.type_enum() == TxnType.Payment,
Approve() # Missing RekeyTo check
)
```
**Attack Scenario**:
1. Attacker submits payment transaction with RekeyTo set to attacker's address
2. Contract approves transaction without checking RekeyTo
3. Account authorization is rekeyed to attacker
4. Attacker gains full control of account
**Recommendation**:
Add explicit validation of the RekeyTo field:
```python
If(And(
Txn.type_enum() == TxnType.Payment,
Txn.rekey_to() == Global.zero_address()
), Approve(), Reject())
```
**References**:
- building-secure-contracts/not-so-smart-contracts/algorand/rekeying
- Tealer detector: `unprotected-rekey`
````
---
## 9. Priority Guidelines
### Critical (Immediate Fix Required)
- Rekeying attacks
- CloseRemainderTo / AssetCloseTo issues
- Access control bypasses
### High (Fix Before Deployment)
- Unchecked transaction fees
- Asset ID validation issues
- Group size validation
- Clear state transaction checks
### Medium (Address in Audit)
- Inner transaction fee issues
- Time-based replay attacks
- DoS via asset opt-in
---
## 10. Testing Recommendations
### Unit Tests Required
- Test each vulnerability scenario with PoC exploit
- Verify fixes prevent exploitation
- Test edge cases (group size = 0, empty addresses, etc.)
### Tealer Integration
```bash
# Add to CI/CD pipeline
tealer approval.teal --detect all --json > tealer-report.json
# Fail build on critical findings
tealer approval.teal --detect all --fail-on critical,high
```
### Scenario Testing
- Submit transactions with all critical fields manipulated
- Test atomic groups with unexpected sizes
- Attempt access control bypasses
- Verify inner transaction fee handling
---
## 11. Additional Resources
- **Building Secure Contracts**: `building-secure-contracts/not-so-smart-contracts/algorand/`
- **Tealer Documentation**: https://github.com/crytic/tealer
- **Algorand Developer Docs**: https://developer.algorand.org/docs/
- **PyTeal Documentation**: https://pyteal.readthedocs.io/
---
## 12. Quick Reference Checklist
Before completing Algorand audit, verify ALL items checked:
- [ ] RekeyTo validated in all transaction types
- [ ] CloseRemainderTo validated in payment transactions
- [ ] AssetCloseTo validated in asset transfers
- [ ] Transaction fees validated (smart signatures)
- [ ] Group size validated for atomic transactions
- [ ] Lease field used for replay protection (where applicable)
- [ ] Access controls on Update/Delete operations
- [ ] Asset ID validated in all asset operations
- [ ] Asset transfers use pull pattern to avoid DoS
- [ ] Inner transaction fees explicitly set to 0
- [ ] OnComplete field validated for ApplicationCall transactions
- [ ] Tealer scan completed with no critical/high findings
- [ ] Unit tests cover all vulnerability scenarios
章节与文件索引
按说明文件中的顺序排列。
1. 目的
2. 何时使用此技能
文件扩展名和指示符
项目结构
工具支持
文件/命令 -> .teal · .py · approval_program.py · clear_program.py · contract.teal · signature.teal · uv tool install tealer · tealer contract.teal --detect all
内容校验值 -> 6cbad9366496
当前原文的自动摘译,尚未人工审校。
1. 目的
系统扫描 Algorand 智能合约(TEAL 和 PyTeal),查找 Trail of Bits 的“Not So Smart Contracts”数据库中记录的特定于平台的安全漏洞。该技能编码了 Algorand 交易模型特有的 11 种关键漏洞模式。
2. 何时使用此技能
审核 Algorand 智能合约(有状态应用程序或智能签名) 审核 TEAL 程序集或 PyTeal 代码 对 Algorand 项目进行预审核安全评估 验证所报告的 Algorand 漏洞的修复程序 针对 Algorand 特定安全模式对团队进行培训
文件扩展名和指示符
TEAL 文件:
.tealPyTeal 文件:.py带有 PyTeal 导入项目结构
approval_program.py/clear_program.pycontract.teal/signature.teal对 Algorand SDK 或 Beaker 框架的引用工具支持
Tealer:Algorand 的 Trail of Bits 静态分析器 安装:
uv tool install tealer(确保 uv 的工具 bin 目录位于 PATH 上) 用法:tealer contract.teal --detect all