kubernetes-etcd-kubernetes-analyze
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- Operating systems
- macOS · Linux · Windows
- Runtime requirements
- Node.js
- Permissions
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- Read-only
- Write / modify
- Network behavior
- External requests
- Install commands
- 26 variants
Profile is derived at build time from SKILL.md and install vectors. Subject to drift from author intent.
Heads up: 未限定 allowed-tools,默认拥有全部工具权限。
---
name: kubernetes-etcd-kubernetes-analyze
description: Assess the security posture of Kubernetes etcd clusters by evaluating encryption at rest, TLS co…
category: devops
runtime: Node.js
---
# kubernetes-etcd-kubernetes-analyze output preview
## PART A: Task fit
- Use case: Assess the security posture of Kubernetes etcd clusters by evaluating encryption at rest, TLS configuration, access controls, backup encryption, and network isolation. Use when this capability is needed..
- Inputs: target material, constraints, expected output, and acceptance criteria.
- Evidence boundary: follow “Overview / When to Use / Prerequisites” and do not present inference as author intent.
## PART B: Execution result
- **01** The card summarizes the use case; runtime output centers on “Assess the security posture of Kubernetes etcd clusters by evaluating encryption at rest, TLS configuration, access controls, backup encryption, and network isolation. Use when this capability is needed.”.
- **02** When the source has headings, the agent prioritizes “Overview / When to Use / Prerequisites” so the result follows the author’s structure.
- **03** Typical output includes task judgment, concrete steps, required commands or file edits, validation, and follow-up options.
- **04** Risk context follows the fingerprint: read files, write/modify files; may access external network resources; usually needs no extra API key.
## Running Rules
- read files, write/modify files; may access external network resources; usually needs no extra API key.
- Validate with a small sample before expanding scope.
- Return the result, validation criteria, and next iteration options. The source mentions slash commands such as `/etc`, `/registry`, `/backup`, `/dev`; use them first when your agent supports command triggers.
Name target files or source material, expected output, forbidden changes, and whether network or shell access is allowed. Permission fingerprint: read files, write/modify files.
Start with a small task and check whether the result follows “Overview / When to Use / Prerequisites”. Inspect diffs, logs, previews, or tests before expanding scope.
Confirm the final output includes a concrete result, evidence, and next action. If it stays generic, tighten inputs, boundaries, and acceptance criteria.
---
name: kubernetes-etcd-kubernetes-analyze
description: Assess the security posture of Kubernetes etcd clusters by evaluating encryption at rest, TLS co…
category: devops
source: tomevault-io/skills-registry
---
# kubernetes-etcd-kubernetes-analyze
## When to use
- Assess the security posture of Kubernetes etcd clusters by evaluating encryption at rest, TLS configuration, access co…
- Use it when the task has clear inputs, repeatable steps, and validation criteria.
## What to provide
- Target material, scope, expected result, and forbidden changes.
- Whether network, commands, file writes, or external services are allowed.
## Execution rules
- Organize steps around “Overview / When to Use / Prerequisites” and keep inference separate from source facts.
- read files, write/modify files; may access external network resources; usually needs no extra API key.
- Validate with a small sample before expanding the task.
## Output requirements
- Return the deliverable, key evidence, validation method, and next action.
- Mark missing information as unknown; do not invent commands, platforms, or dependencies. The author source anchors workflow facts; repository files anchor sources and commands; Fluxly only adds fit, limitations, and quality judgment.
skill "kubernetes-etcd-kubernetes-analyze" {
input -> user goal + target files + boundaries + acceptance criteria
context -> Overview / When to Use / Prerequisites
rules -> SKILL.md triggers / order / output contract
runtime -> Node.js | read files, write/modify files | may access external network resources
guardrails -> usually needs no extra API key + small-sample validation + diff/log review
output -> copyable result + checklist + next iteration
} Performing Kubernetes etcd Security Assessment
Overview
etcd is the distributed key-value store that serves as Kubernetes' backing store for all cluster data, including Secrets, RBAC policies, ConfigMaps, and workload configurations. Without proper hardening, etcd exposes all cluster secrets in plaintext, making it the highest-value target for attackers who gain control plane access. A comprehensive security assessment covers encryption at rest, TLS for transport, access control, backup security, and network isolation.
When to Use
- When conducting security assessments that involve performing kubernetes etcd security assessment
- When following incident response procedures for related security events
- When performing scheduled security testing or auditing activities
- When validating security controls through hands-on testing
Prerequisites
- Access to Kubernetes control plane nodes
- SSH access to etcd cluster nodes (or etcdctl configured)
- CIS Kubernetes Benchmark reference document
- Understanding of TLS certificate management and EncryptionConfiguration
Assessment Areas
1. Encryption at Rest
Verify that Kubernetes encrypts Secret data stored in etcd:
# Check if EncryptionConfiguration is configured on API server
ps aux | grep kube-apiserver | grep encryption-provider-config
# View the encryption configuration
cat /etc/kubernetes/enc/encryption-config.yaml
Expected secure configuration:
apiVersion: apiserver.config.k8s.io/v1
kind: EncryptionConfiguration
resources:
- resources:
- secrets
- configmaps
providers:
- aescbc:
keys:
- name: key1
secret: <base64-encoded-32-byte-key>
- identity: {} # Fallback for reading unencrypted data
Verify secrets are actually encrypted in etcd:
# Read a secret directly from etcd
ETCDCTL_API=3 etcdctl \
--endpoints=https://127.0.0.1:2379 \
--cacert=/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/ca.crt \
--cert=/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/server.crt \
--key=/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/server.key \
get /registry/secrets/default/my-secret | hexdump -C | head -20
# If encrypted, output starts with "k8s:enc:aescbc:v1:key1"
# If NOT encrypted, you'll see plaintext key-value pairs
2. TLS Transport Security
# Verify etcd uses TLS for client connections
ETCDCTL_API=3 etcdctl endpoint health \
--endpoints=https://127.0.0.1:2379 \
--cacert=/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/ca.crt \
--cert=/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/server.crt \
--key=/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/server.key
# Check peer TLS configuration
ps aux | grep etcd | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -E "peer-cert|peer-key|peer-trusted-ca"
# Verify certificate expiration
openssl x509 -in /etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/server.crt -noout -enddate
openssl x509 -in /etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/peer.crt -noout -enddate
Expected flags:
| Flag | Required Value | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
--cert-file |
Path to server cert | Client-to-server TLS |
--key-file |
Path to server key | Client-to-server TLS |
--trusted-ca-file |
Path to CA cert | Client certificate validation |
--peer-cert-file |
Path to peer cert | Peer-to-peer TLS |
--peer-key-file |
Path to peer key | Peer-to-peer TLS |
--peer-trusted-ca-file |
Path to peer CA | Peer certificate validation |
--client-cert-auth |
true | Require client certificates |
--peer-client-cert-auth |
true | Require peer certificates |
3. Access Control
# Verify etcd is not exposed on all interfaces
ps aux | grep etcd | tr ' ' '\n' | grep listen-client-urls
# Should be: https://127.0.0.1:2379 (not 0.0.0.0)
# Check who can access etcd certificates
ls -la /etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/
# Should be readable only by root/etcd user
# Verify API server is the only etcd client
ss -tlnp | grep 2379
# Only kube-apiserver should have connections
4. Backup Security
# Create an encrypted etcd backup
ETCDCTL_API=3 etcdctl snapshot save /backup/etcd-snapshot.db \
--endpoints=https://127.0.0.1:2379 \
--cacert=/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/ca.crt \
--cert=/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/server.crt \
--key=/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/server.key
# Encrypt the backup file
gpg --symmetric --cipher-algo AES256 /backup/etcd-snapshot.db
# Verify backup integrity
ETCDCTL_API=3 etcdctl snapshot status /backup/etcd-snapshot.db --write-out=table
5. Network Isolation
# Verify etcd ports are firewalled
iptables -L -n | grep -E "2379|2380"
# Check if etcd is accessible from worker nodes (should NOT be)
# Run from a worker node:
curl -k https://<control-plane-ip>:2379/health
# Should be rejected/timeout
CIS Benchmark Checks
| CIS Control | Check | Expected Result |
|---|---|---|
| 2.1 | etcd cert-file set | TLS certificate configured |
| 2.2 | etcd client-cert-auth | Client certificate authentication enabled |
| 2.3 | etcd auto-tls disabled | auto-tls=false |
| 2.4 | etcd peer cert-file set | Peer TLS configured |
| 2.5 | etcd peer client-cert-auth | Peer authentication enabled |
| 2.6 | etcd peer auto-tls disabled | peer-auto-tls=false |
| 2.7 | etcd unique CA | Separate CA for etcd (not shared with cluster) |
Key Rotation Procedure
# 1. Generate new encryption key
NEW_KEY=$(head -c 32 /dev/urandom | base64)
# 2. Update EncryptionConfiguration with new key first
cat > /etc/kubernetes/enc/encryption-config.yaml <<EOF
apiVersion: apiserver.config.k8s.io/v1
kind: EncryptionConfiguration
resources:
- resources:
- secrets
providers:
- aescbc:
keys:
- name: key2
secret: ${NEW_KEY}
- name: key1
secret: <old-key>
- identity: {}
EOF
# 3. Restart API server to pick up new config
# 4. Re-encrypt all secrets with new key
kubectl get secrets --all-namespaces -o json | \
kubectl replace -f -
# 5. Remove old key from EncryptionConfiguration
# 6. Restart API server again
References
- Kubernetes etcd Encryption Documentation
- CIS Kubernetes Benchmark - etcd Controls
- Securing etcd - K8s Security Guide
- Infosec: Encryption and etcd
Source: DCx7C5/ai-marketplace — distributed by TomeVault.
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Design Intent
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