分析
- 作者仓库星标 0
- 作者仓库 skills-registry
- 领域
- 运维部署
- 作者声明的智能体
- 未找到明确声明;不据此推断已兼容或已测试
- 静态检查
- 88 / 100 · 启发式扫描,不代表运行安全
- 运行环境证据
- 未执行;当前没有隔离运行测试证据
- 作者 / 版本 / 许可证
- @tomevault-io · 未声明许可证
- 上下文用量评级
- 低消耗
- 接入复杂程度
- 即装即用
- 是否需要外部接口密钥
- 不需要
- 兼容的系统
- macOS · Linux · Windows
- 运行环境要求
- Node.js
- 检测到的文件与系统行为
-
- 只读
- 允许写入 / 修改
- 网络行为
- 允许外网请求
- 安装命令数
- 无(仅作为资料)
需要注意: 未声明工具权限范围;实际权限由运行环境决定。
# Performing Kubernetes etcd Security Assessment
## Overview
etcd is the distributed key-value store that serves as Kubernetes' backing store for all cluster data, including Secrets, RBAC policies, ConfigMaps, and workload configurations. Without proper hardening, etcd exposes all cluster secrets in plaintext, making it the highest-value target for attackers who gain control plane access. A comprehensive security assessment covers encryption at rest, TLS for transport, access control, backup security, and network isolation.
## When to Use
- When conducting security assessments that involve performing kubernetes etcd security assessment
- When following incident response procedures for related security events
- When performing scheduled security testing or auditing activities
- When validating security controls through hands-on testing
## Prerequisites
- Access to Kubernetes control plane nodes
- SSH access to etcd cluster nodes (or etcdctl configured)
- CIS Kubernetes Benchmark reference document
- Understanding of TLS certificate management and EncryptionConfiguration
## Assessment Areas
### 1. Encryption at Rest
Verify that Kubernetes encrypts Secret data stored in etcd:
```bash
# Check if EncryptionConfiguration is configured on API server
ps aux | grep kube-apiserver | grep encryption-provider-config
# View the encryption configuration
cat /etc/kubernetes/enc/encryption-config.yaml
```
Expected secure configuration:
```yaml
apiVersion: apiserver.config.k8s.io/v1
kind: EncryptionConfiguration
resources:
- resources:
- secrets
- configmaps
providers:
- aescbc:
keys:
- name: key1
secret: <base64-encoded-32-byte-key>
- identity: {} # Fallback for reading unencrypted data
```
Verify secrets are actually encrypted in etcd:
```bash
# Read a secret directly from etcd
ETCDCTL_API=3 etcdctl \
--endpoints=https://127.0.0.1:2379 \
--cacert=/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/ca.crt \
--cert=/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/server.crt \
--key=/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/server.key \
get /registry/secrets/default/my-secret | hexdump -C | head -20
# If encrypted, output starts with "k8s:enc:aescbc:v1:key1"
# If NOT encrypted, you'll see plaintext key-value pairs
```
### 2. TLS Transport Security
```bash
# Verify etcd uses TLS for client connections
ETCDCTL_API=3 etcdctl endpoint health \
--endpoints=https://127.0.0.1:2379 \
--cacert=/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/ca.crt \
--cert=/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/server.crt \
--key=/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/server.key
# Check peer TLS configuration
ps aux | grep etcd | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -E "peer-cert|peer-key|peer-trusted-ca"
# Verify certificate expiration
openssl x509 -in /etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/server.crt -noout -enddate
openssl x509 -in /etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/peer.crt -noout -enddate
```
Expected flags:
| Flag | Required Value | Purpose |
|------|---------------|---------|
| `--cert-file` | Path to server cert | Client-to-server TLS |
| `--key-file` | Path to server key | Client-to-server TLS |
| `--trusted-ca-file` | Path to CA cert | Client certificate validation |
| `--peer-cert-file` | Path to peer cert | Peer-to-peer TLS |
| `--peer-key-file` | Path to peer key | Peer-to-peer TLS |
| `--peer-trusted-ca-file` | Path to peer CA | Peer certificate validation |
| `--client-cert-auth` | true | Require client certificates |
| `--peer-client-cert-auth` | true | Require peer certificates |
### 3. Access Control
```bash
# Verify etcd is not exposed on all interfaces
ps aux | grep etcd | tr ' ' '\n' | grep listen-client-urls
# Should be: https://127.0.0.1:2379 (not 0.0.0.0)
# Check who can access etcd certificates
ls -la /etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/
# Should be readable only by root/etcd user
# Verify API server is the only etcd client
ss -tlnp | grep 2379
# Only kube-apiserver should have connections
```
### 4. Backup Security
```bash
# Create an encrypted etcd backup
ETCDCTL_API=3 etcdctl snapshot save /backup/etcd-snapshot.db \
--endpoints=https://127.0.0.1:2379 \
--cacert=/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/ca.crt \
--cert=/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/server.crt \
--key=/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/server.key
# Encrypt the backup file
gpg --symmetric --cipher-algo AES256 /backup/etcd-snapshot.db
# Verify backup integrity
ETCDCTL_API=3 etcdctl snapshot status /backup/etcd-snapshot.db --write-out=table
```
### 5. Network Isolation
```bash
# Verify etcd ports are firewalled
iptables -L -n | grep -E "2379|2380"
# Check if etcd is accessible from worker nodes (should NOT be)
# Run from a worker node:
curl -k https://<control-plane-ip>:2379/health
# Should be rejected/timeout
```
## CIS Benchmark Checks
| CIS Control | Check | Expected Result |
|-------------|-------|----------------|
| 2.1 | etcd cert-file set | TLS certificate configured |
| 2.2 | etcd client-cert-auth | Client certificate authentication enabled |
| 2.3 | etcd auto-tls disabled | auto-tls=false |
| 2.4 | etcd peer cert-file set | Peer TLS configured |
| 2.5 | etcd peer client-cert-auth | Peer authentication enabled |
| 2.6 | etcd peer auto-tls disabled | peer-auto-tls=false |
| 2.7 | etcd unique CA | Separate CA for etcd (not shared with cluster) |
## Key Rotation Procedure
```bash
# 1. Generate new encryption key
NEW_KEY=$(head -c 32 /dev/urandom | base64)
# 2. Update EncryptionConfiguration with new key first
cat > /etc/kubernetes/enc/encryption-config.yaml <<EOF
apiVersion: apiserver.config.k8s.io/v1
kind: EncryptionConfiguration
resources:
- resources:
- secrets
providers:
- aescbc:
keys:
- name: key2
secret: ${NEW_KEY}
- name: key1
secret: <old-key>
- identity: {}
EOF
# 3. Restart API server to pick up new config
# 4. Re-encrypt all secrets with new key
kubectl get secrets --all-namespaces -o json | \
kubectl replace -f -
# 5. Remove old key from EncryptionConfiguration
# 6. Restart API server again
```
## References
- [Kubernetes etcd Encryption Documentation](https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/encrypt-data/)
- [CIS Kubernetes Benchmark - etcd Controls](https://www.cisecurity.org/benchmark/kubernetes)
- [Securing etcd - K8s Security Guide](https://k8s-security.geek-kb.com/docs/best_practices/cluster_setup_and_hardening/control_plane_security/etcd_security_mitigation/)
- [Infosec: Encryption and etcd](https://www.infosecinstitute.com/resources/cryptography/encryption-and-etcd-the-key-to-securing-kubernetes/)
---
> Source: [DCx7C5/ai-marketplace](https://github.com/DCx7C5/ai-marketplace) — distributed by [TomeVault](https://tomevault.io).
<!-- tomevault:4.0:skill_md:2026-05-22 -->
章节与文件索引
按说明文件中的顺序排列。
概述
何时使用
先决条件
1.静态加密
2.TLS传输安全
文件/命令 -> --cert-file · --key-file · --trusted-ca-file · --peer-cert-file · --peer-key-file · --peer-trusted-ca-file · --client-cert-auth · --peer-client-cert-auth
内容校验值 -> c807d933e545
当前原文的自动摘译,尚未人工审校。
概述
etcd 是分布式键值存储,充当 Kubernetes 所有集群数据的后备存储,包括 Secret、RBAC 策略、ConfigMap 和工作负载配置。如果没有适当的强化,etcd 就会以明文形式暴露所有集群秘密,使其成为获得控制平面访问权限的攻击者的最高价值目标。全面的安全评估涵盖静态加密、传输 TLS、访问控制、备份安全和网络隔离。
何时使用
当进行涉及执行 kubernetes etcd 安全评估的安全评估时 当遵循相关安全事件的事件响应程序时 当执行计划的安全测试或审核活动时 当通过实践测试验证安全控制时
先决条件
访问 Kubernetes 控制平面节点 SSH 访问 etcd 集群节点(或配置的 etcdctl) CIS Kubernetes Benchmark 参考文档 了解 TLS 证书管理和加密配置
1.静态加密
验证 Kubernetes 是否对存储在 etcd 中的机密数据进行加密: 预期的安全配置: 验证机密实际上已在 etcd 中加密:
2.TLS传输安全
预期标志: 标志 · 所需值 · 用途
--cert-file· 服务器证书路径 · 客户端到服务器 TLS--key-file· 服务器密钥路径 · 客户端到服务器 TLS--trusted-ca-file· CA 证书路径 · 客户端证书验证