差别审查

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技能解读

当前原文的自动摘译,尚未人工审校。

核心原则

风险优先:关注身份验证、加密、价值转移、外部调用 基于证据:每项发现均由 git 历史记录、行号、攻击场景支持 自适应:扩展到代码库大小(小/中/大) 诚实:明确说明覆盖范围限制和置信水平 输出驱动:始终生成全面的 Markdown 报告文件

合理化(不要跳过)

合理化 · 为什么这是错误的 · 需要采取的行动 “小 PR,快速审查” · Heartbleed 是 2 行 · 按风险分类,而不是大小 “我知道这个代码库” · 熟悉会滋生盲点 · 建立明确的基线上下文 “Git 历史记录需要太长的时间” · 历史揭示回归 · 永远不要跳过第 1 阶段 “爆炸半径很明显” · 你会错过传递调用者 · 定量计算

代码库大小策略

代码库大小 · 策略 · 方法 小(<20 个文件) · 深入 · 读取所有 deps,完整的 git 责任 中(20-200) · 集中 · 1 跳 deps,优先级文件 大(200+) · 外科手术 · 仅关键路径

风险水平触发因素

风险级别 · 触发器 高 · 身份验证、加密、外部调用、价值转移、验证删除 中 · 业务逻辑、状态更改、新的公共 API 低 · 评论、测试、UI、日志记录

决策树

开始审查?

流狐档案 运行与权限由流狐静态检查推断,不代表作者声明或实际测试结果。
领域
工程开发
作者声明的智能体
未找到明确声明;不据此推断已兼容或已测试
静态检查
88 / 100 · 启发式扫描,不代表运行安全
运行环境证据
未执行;当前没有隔离运行测试证据
作者 / 版本 / 许可证
@trailofbits · 未声明许可证
上下文用量评级
低消耗
接入复杂程度
即装即用
是否需要外部接口密钥
不需要
兼容的系统
未声明(默认跨平台)
运行环境要求
未检出明确要求
检测到的文件与系统行为
  • 只读
  • 允许写入 / 修改
网络行为
仅限本地
安装命令数
无(仅作为资料)

需要注意: 未声明工具权限范围;实际权限由运行环境决定。

作者说明文件(原文) SKILL.md

# Differential Security Review

Security-focused code review for PRs, commits, and diffs.

## Core Principles

1. **Risk-First**: Focus on auth, crypto, value transfer, external calls
2. **Evidence-Based**: Every finding backed by git history, line numbers, attack scenarios
3. **Adaptive**: Scale to codebase size (SMALL/MEDIUM/LARGE)
4. **Honest**: Explicitly state coverage limits and confidence level
5. **Output-Driven**: Always generate comprehensive markdown report file

---

## Rationalizations (Do Not Skip)

| Rationalization | Why It's Wrong | Required Action |
|-----------------|----------------|-----------------|
| "Small PR, quick review" | Heartbleed was 2 lines | Classify by RISK, not size |
| "I know this codebase" | Familiarity breeds blind spots | Build explicit baseline context |
| "Git history takes too long" | History reveals regressions | Never skip Phase 1 |
| "Blast radius is obvious" | You'll miss transitive callers | Calculate quantitatively |
| "No tests = not my problem" | Missing tests = elevated risk rating | Flag in report, elevate severity |
| "Just a refactor, no security impact" | Refactors break invariants | Analyze as HIGH until proven LOW |
| "I'll explain verbally" | No artifact = findings lost | Always write report |

---

## Quick Reference

### Codebase Size Strategy

| Codebase Size | Strategy | Approach |
|---------------|----------|----------|
| SMALL (<20 files) | DEEP | Read all deps, full git blame |
| MEDIUM (20-200) | FOCUSED | 1-hop deps, priority files |
| LARGE (200+) | SURGICAL | Critical paths only |

### Risk Level Triggers

| Risk Level | Triggers |
|------------|----------|
| HIGH | Auth, crypto, external calls, value transfer, validation removal |
| MEDIUM | Business logic, state changes, new public APIs |
| LOW | Comments, tests, UI, logging |

---

## Workflow Overview

```
Pre-Analysis → Phase 0: Triage → Phase 1: Code Analysis → Phase 2: Test Coverage
    ↓              ↓                    ↓                        ↓
Phase 3: Blast Radius → Phase 4: Deep Context → Phase 5: Adversarial → Phase 6: Report
```

---

## Decision Tree

**Starting a review?**

```
├─ Need detailed phase-by-phase methodology?
│  └─ Read: methodology.md
│     (Pre-Analysis + Phases 0-4: triage, code analysis, test coverage, blast radius)
│
├─ Analyzing HIGH RISK change?
│  ├─ Read: adversarial.md
│  │  (Phase 5: Attacker modeling, exploit scenarios, exploitability rating)
│  └─ Or delegate to: adversarial-modeler agent
│     (Autonomous attacker modeling with concrete exploit scenarios)
│
├─ Writing the final report?
│  └─ Read: reporting.md
│     (Phase 6: Report structure, templates, formatting guidelines)
│
├─ Looking for specific vulnerability patterns?
│  └─ Read: patterns.md
│     (Regressions, reentrancy, access control, overflow, etc.)
│
└─ Quick triage only?
   └─ Use Quick Reference above, skip detailed docs
```

---

## Agents

**`adversarial-modeler`** — Models attacker perspectives and builds exploit
scenarios for HIGH RISK code changes. Follows the 5-step adversarial
methodology (attacker model, attack vectors, exploitability rating, exploit
scenario, baseline cross-reference) and produces structured vulnerability
reports. Delegate to this agent when Phase 5 analysis is needed on high-risk
changes.

---

## Quality Checklist

Before delivering:

- [ ] All changed files analyzed
- [ ] Git blame on removed security code
- [ ] Blast radius calculated for HIGH risk
- [ ] Attack scenarios are concrete (not generic)
- [ ] Findings reference specific line numbers + commits
- [ ] Report file generated
- [ ] User notified with summary

---

## Integration

**audit-context-building skill:**
- Pre-Analysis: Build baseline context
- Phase 4: Deep context on HIGH RISK changes

**issue-writer skill:**
- Transform findings into formal audit reports
- Command: `issue-writer --input DIFFERENTIAL_REVIEW_REPORT.md --format audit-report`

---

## Example Usage

### Quick Triage (Small PR)
```
Input: 5 file PR, 2 HIGH RISK files
Strategy: Use Quick Reference
1. Classify risk level per file (2 HIGH, 3 LOW)
2. Focus on 2 HIGH files only
3. Git blame removed code
4. Generate minimal report
Time: ~30 minutes
```

### Standard Review (Medium Codebase)
```
Input: 80 files, 12 HIGH RISK changes
Strategy: FOCUSED (see methodology.md)
1. Full workflow on HIGH RISK files
2. Surface scan on MEDIUM
3. Skip LOW risk files
4. Complete report with all sections
Time: ~3-4 hours
```

### Deep Audit (Large, Critical Change)
```
Input: 450 files, auth system rewrite
Strategy: SURGICAL + audit-context-building
1. Baseline context with audit-context-building
2. Deep analysis on auth changes only
3. Blast radius analysis
4. Adversarial modeling
5. Comprehensive report
Time: ~6-8 hours
```

---

## When NOT to Use This Skill

- **Greenfield code** (no baseline to compare)
- **Documentation-only changes** (no security impact)
- **Formatting/linting** (cosmetic changes)
- **User explicitly requests quick summary only** (they accept risk)

For these cases, use standard code review instead.

---

## Red Flags (Stop and Investigate)

**Immediate escalation triggers:**
- Removed code from "security", "CVE", or "fix" commits
- Access control modifiers removed (onlyOwner, internal → external)
- Validation removed without replacement
- External calls added without checks
- High blast radius (50+ callers) + HIGH risk change

These patterns require adversarial analysis even in quick triage.

---

## Tips for Best Results

**Do:**
- Start with git blame for removed code
- Calculate blast radius early to prioritize
- Generate concrete attack scenarios
- Reference specific line numbers and commits
- Be honest about coverage limitations
- Always generate the output file

**Don't:**
- Skip git history analysis
- Make generic findings without evidence
- Claim full analysis when time-limited
- Forget to check test coverage
- Miss high blast radius changes
- Output report only to chat (file required)

---

## Supporting Documentation

- **[methodology.md](methodology.md)** - Detailed phase-by-phase workflow (Phases 0-4)
- **[adversarial.md](adversarial.md)** - Attacker modeling and exploit scenarios (Phase 5)
- **[reporting.md](reporting.md)** - Report structure and formatting (Phase 6)
- **[patterns.md](patterns.md)** - Common vulnerability patterns reference

---

**For first-time users:** Start with [methodology.md](methodology.md) to understand the complete workflow.

**For experienced users:** Use this page's Quick Reference and Decision Tree to navigate directly to needed content.

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