差别审查
- 作者仓库星标 0
- 作者更新于 2026年8月24日 23:09
- 作者仓库 skills
- 领域
- 工程开发
- 作者声明的智能体
- 未找到明确声明;不据此推断已兼容或已测试
- 静态检查
- 88 / 100 · 启发式扫描,不代表运行安全
- 运行环境证据
- 未执行;当前没有隔离运行测试证据
- 作者 / 版本 / 许可证
- @trailofbits · 未声明许可证
- 上下文用量评级
- 低消耗
- 接入复杂程度
- 即装即用
- 是否需要外部接口密钥
- 不需要
- 兼容的系统
- 未声明(默认跨平台)
- 运行环境要求
- 未检出明确要求
- 检测到的文件与系统行为
-
- 只读
- 允许写入 / 修改
- 网络行为
- 仅限本地
- 安装命令数
- 无(仅作为资料)
需要注意: 未声明工具权限范围;实际权限由运行环境决定。
# Differential Security Review
Security-focused code review for PRs, commits, and diffs.
## Core Principles
1. **Risk-First**: Focus on auth, crypto, value transfer, external calls
2. **Evidence-Based**: Every finding backed by git history, line numbers, attack scenarios
3. **Adaptive**: Scale to codebase size (SMALL/MEDIUM/LARGE)
4. **Honest**: Explicitly state coverage limits and confidence level
5. **Output-Driven**: Always generate comprehensive markdown report file
---
## Rationalizations (Do Not Skip)
| Rationalization | Why It's Wrong | Required Action |
|-----------------|----------------|-----------------|
| "Small PR, quick review" | Heartbleed was 2 lines | Classify by RISK, not size |
| "I know this codebase" | Familiarity breeds blind spots | Build explicit baseline context |
| "Git history takes too long" | History reveals regressions | Never skip Phase 1 |
| "Blast radius is obvious" | You'll miss transitive callers | Calculate quantitatively |
| "No tests = not my problem" | Missing tests = elevated risk rating | Flag in report, elevate severity |
| "Just a refactor, no security impact" | Refactors break invariants | Analyze as HIGH until proven LOW |
| "I'll explain verbally" | No artifact = findings lost | Always write report |
---
## Quick Reference
### Codebase Size Strategy
| Codebase Size | Strategy | Approach |
|---------------|----------|----------|
| SMALL (<20 files) | DEEP | Read all deps, full git blame |
| MEDIUM (20-200) | FOCUSED | 1-hop deps, priority files |
| LARGE (200+) | SURGICAL | Critical paths only |
### Risk Level Triggers
| Risk Level | Triggers |
|------------|----------|
| HIGH | Auth, crypto, external calls, value transfer, validation removal |
| MEDIUM | Business logic, state changes, new public APIs |
| LOW | Comments, tests, UI, logging |
---
## Workflow Overview
```
Pre-Analysis → Phase 0: Triage → Phase 1: Code Analysis → Phase 2: Test Coverage
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
Phase 3: Blast Radius → Phase 4: Deep Context → Phase 5: Adversarial → Phase 6: Report
```
---
## Decision Tree
**Starting a review?**
```
├─ Need detailed phase-by-phase methodology?
│ └─ Read: methodology.md
│ (Pre-Analysis + Phases 0-4: triage, code analysis, test coverage, blast radius)
│
├─ Analyzing HIGH RISK change?
│ ├─ Read: adversarial.md
│ │ (Phase 5: Attacker modeling, exploit scenarios, exploitability rating)
│ └─ Or delegate to: adversarial-modeler agent
│ (Autonomous attacker modeling with concrete exploit scenarios)
│
├─ Writing the final report?
│ └─ Read: reporting.md
│ (Phase 6: Report structure, templates, formatting guidelines)
│
├─ Looking for specific vulnerability patterns?
│ └─ Read: patterns.md
│ (Regressions, reentrancy, access control, overflow, etc.)
│
└─ Quick triage only?
└─ Use Quick Reference above, skip detailed docs
```
---
## Agents
**`adversarial-modeler`** — Models attacker perspectives and builds exploit
scenarios for HIGH RISK code changes. Follows the 5-step adversarial
methodology (attacker model, attack vectors, exploitability rating, exploit
scenario, baseline cross-reference) and produces structured vulnerability
reports. Delegate to this agent when Phase 5 analysis is needed on high-risk
changes.
---
## Quality Checklist
Before delivering:
- [ ] All changed files analyzed
- [ ] Git blame on removed security code
- [ ] Blast radius calculated for HIGH risk
- [ ] Attack scenarios are concrete (not generic)
- [ ] Findings reference specific line numbers + commits
- [ ] Report file generated
- [ ] User notified with summary
---
## Integration
**audit-context-building skill:**
- Pre-Analysis: Build baseline context
- Phase 4: Deep context on HIGH RISK changes
**issue-writer skill:**
- Transform findings into formal audit reports
- Command: `issue-writer --input DIFFERENTIAL_REVIEW_REPORT.md --format audit-report`
---
## Example Usage
### Quick Triage (Small PR)
```
Input: 5 file PR, 2 HIGH RISK files
Strategy: Use Quick Reference
1. Classify risk level per file (2 HIGH, 3 LOW)
2. Focus on 2 HIGH files only
3. Git blame removed code
4. Generate minimal report
Time: ~30 minutes
```
### Standard Review (Medium Codebase)
```
Input: 80 files, 12 HIGH RISK changes
Strategy: FOCUSED (see methodology.md)
1. Full workflow on HIGH RISK files
2. Surface scan on MEDIUM
3. Skip LOW risk files
4. Complete report with all sections
Time: ~3-4 hours
```
### Deep Audit (Large, Critical Change)
```
Input: 450 files, auth system rewrite
Strategy: SURGICAL + audit-context-building
1. Baseline context with audit-context-building
2. Deep analysis on auth changes only
3. Blast radius analysis
4. Adversarial modeling
5. Comprehensive report
Time: ~6-8 hours
```
---
## When NOT to Use This Skill
- **Greenfield code** (no baseline to compare)
- **Documentation-only changes** (no security impact)
- **Formatting/linting** (cosmetic changes)
- **User explicitly requests quick summary only** (they accept risk)
For these cases, use standard code review instead.
---
## Red Flags (Stop and Investigate)
**Immediate escalation triggers:**
- Removed code from "security", "CVE", or "fix" commits
- Access control modifiers removed (onlyOwner, internal → external)
- Validation removed without replacement
- External calls added without checks
- High blast radius (50+ callers) + HIGH risk change
These patterns require adversarial analysis even in quick triage.
---
## Tips for Best Results
**Do:**
- Start with git blame for removed code
- Calculate blast radius early to prioritize
- Generate concrete attack scenarios
- Reference specific line numbers and commits
- Be honest about coverage limitations
- Always generate the output file
**Don't:**
- Skip git history analysis
- Make generic findings without evidence
- Claim full analysis when time-limited
- Forget to check test coverage
- Miss high blast radius changes
- Output report only to chat (file required)
---
## Supporting Documentation
- **[methodology.md](methodology.md)** - Detailed phase-by-phase workflow (Phases 0-4)
- **[adversarial.md](adversarial.md)** - Attacker modeling and exploit scenarios (Phase 5)
- **[reporting.md](reporting.md)** - Report structure and formatting (Phase 6)
- **[patterns.md](patterns.md)** - Common vulnerability patterns reference
---
**For first-time users:** Start with [methodology.md](methodology.md) to understand the complete workflow.
**For experienced users:** Use this page's Quick Reference and Decision Tree to navigate directly to needed content.
章节与文件索引
按说明文件中的顺序排列。
核心原则
合理化(不要跳过)
代码库大小策略
风险水平触发因素
决策树
文件/命令 -> adversarial-modeler · issue-writer --input DIFFERENTIAL_REVIEW_REPORT.md --format audit-report · SMALL/MEDIUM/LARGE · methodology.md · adversarial.md · reporting.md · patterns.md · DIFFERENTIAL_REVIEW_REPORT.md
内容校验值 -> 9c7c781d9c42
当前原文的自动摘译,尚未人工审校。
核心原则
风险优先:关注身份验证、加密、价值转移、外部调用 基于证据:每项发现均由 git 历史记录、行号、攻击场景支持 自适应:扩展到代码库大小(小/中/大) 诚实:明确说明覆盖范围限制和置信水平 输出驱动:始终生成全面的 Markdown 报告文件
合理化(不要跳过)
合理化 · 为什么这是错误的 · 需要采取的行动 “小 PR,快速审查” · Heartbleed 是 2 行 · 按风险分类,而不是大小 “我知道这个代码库” · 熟悉会滋生盲点 · 建立明确的基线上下文 “Git 历史记录需要太长的时间” · 历史揭示回归 · 永远不要跳过第 1 阶段 “爆炸半径很明显” · 你会错过传递调用者 · 定量计算
代码库大小策略
代码库大小 · 策略 · 方法 小(<20 个文件) · 深入 · 读取所有 deps,完整的 git 责任 中(20-200) · 集中 · 1 跳 deps,优先级文件 大(200+) · 外科手术 · 仅关键路径
风险水平触发因素
风险级别 · 触发器 高 · 身份验证、加密、外部调用、价值转移、验证删除 中 · 业务逻辑、状态更改、新的公共 API 低 · 评论、测试、UI、日志记录
决策树
开始审查?