漏洞扫描器
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- 作者更新于 2026年8月24日 23:09
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- 88 / 100 · 启发式扫描,不代表运行安全
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- @trailofbits · 未声明许可证
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- 检测到的文件与系统行为
-
- 只读
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- 命令执行
- 网络行为
- 仅限本地
- 安装命令数
- 无(仅作为资料)
需要注意: 未声明工具权限范围;实际权限由运行环境决定。
第 1 步:平台识别
验证 Solana 程序(本机或 Anchor) 检查 Solana 版本(1.8.1+ 用于 sysvar 安全) 查找程序源 (`programs/*/src/lib.rs`) 识别框架(本机与 Anchor)
第 2 步:CPI 安全审查
对于每个 CPI: [ ] 调用前验证程序 ID [ ] 无法传递用户控制的程序帐户 [ ] 锚点:使用 `Program<'info, T>` 类型
第 3 步:PDA 验证检查
对于每个 PDA: [ ] 使用 `find_program_address()` 或锚点 `seeds` 约束 [ ] 存储并重复使用凹凸种子 [ ] 不使用用户提供的凹凸
第 4 步:帐户验证扫描
对于使用的每个帐户: [ ] 反序列化前验证所有者 [ ] 签名者检查权限帐户 [ ] 锚点:使用 `Account<'info, T>` 和 `Signer<'info>`
第 5 步:指令内省审查
[ ] 使用检查函数 (Solana 1.8.1+) [ ] 使用相对索引 [ ] 正确的相关性验证
# Solana Vulnerability Scanner
## 1. Purpose
Systematically scan Solana programs (native and Anchor framework) for platform-specific security vulnerabilities related to cross-program invocations, account validation, and program-derived addresses. This skill encodes 6 critical vulnerability patterns unique to Solana's account model.
## 2. When to Use This Skill
- Auditing Solana programs (native Rust or Anchor)
- Reviewing cross-program invocation (CPI) logic
- Validating program-derived address (PDA) implementations
- Pre-launch security assessment of Solana protocols
- Reviewing account validation patterns
- Assessing instruction introspection logic
## 3. Platform Detection
### File Extensions & Indicators
- **Rust files**: `.rs`
### Language/Framework Markers
```rust
// Native Solana program indicators
use solana_program::{
account_info::AccountInfo,
entrypoint,
entrypoint::ProgramResult,
pubkey::Pubkey,
program::invoke,
program::invoke_signed,
};
entrypoint!(process_instruction);
// Anchor framework indicators
use anchor_lang::prelude::*;
#[program]
pub mod my_program {
pub fn initialize(ctx: Context<Initialize>) -> Result<()> {
// Program logic
}
}
#[derive(Accounts)]
pub struct Initialize<'info> {
#[account(mut)]
pub authority: Signer<'info>,
}
// Common patterns
AccountInfo, Pubkey
invoke(), invoke_signed()
Signer<'info>, Account<'info>
#[account(...)] with constraints
seeds, bump
```
### Project Structure
- `programs/*/src/lib.rs` - Program implementation
- `Anchor.toml` - Anchor configuration
- `Cargo.toml` with `solana-program` or `anchor-lang`
- `tests/` - Program tests
### Tool Support
- **Trail of Bits Solana Lints**: Rust linters for Solana
- Installation: Add to Cargo.toml
- **anchor test**: Built-in testing framework
- **Solana Test Validator**: Local testing environment
---
## 4. How This Skill Works
When invoked, I will:
1. **Search your codebase** for Solana/Anchor programs
2. **Analyze each program** for the 6 vulnerability patterns
3. **Report findings** with file references and severity
4. **Provide fixes** for each identified issue
5. **Check account validation** and CPI security
---
## 5. Example Output
---
## 6. Vulnerability Patterns (6 Patterns)
I check for 6 critical vulnerability patterns unique to Solana. For detailed detection patterns, code examples, mitigations, and testing strategies, see [VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md](resources/VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md).
### Pattern Summary:
1. **Arbitrary CPI** ⚠️ CRITICAL - User-controlled program IDs in CPI calls
2. **Improper PDA Validation** ⚠️ CRITICAL - Using create_program_address without canonical bump
3. **Missing Ownership Check** ⚠️ HIGH - Deserializing accounts without owner validation
4. **Missing Signer Check** ⚠️ CRITICAL - Authority operations without is_signer check
5. **Sysvar Account Check** ⚠️ HIGH - Spoofed sysvar accounts (pre-Solana 1.8.1)
6. **Improper Instruction Introspection** ⚠️ MEDIUM - Absolute indexes allowing reuse
For complete vulnerability patterns with code examples, see [VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md](resources/VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md).
## 7. Scanning Workflow
### Step 1: Platform Identification
1. Verify Solana program (native or Anchor)
2. Check Solana version (1.8.1+ for sysvar security)
3. Locate program source (`programs/*/src/lib.rs`)
4. Identify framework (native vs Anchor)
### Step 2: CPI Security Review
```bash
# Find all CPI calls
rg "invoke\(|invoke_signed\(" programs/
# Check for program ID validation before each
# Should see program ID checks immediately before invoke
```
For each CPI:
- [ ] Program ID validated before invocation
- [ ] Cannot pass user-controlled program accounts
- [ ] Anchor: Uses `Program<'info, T>` type
### Step 3: PDA Validation Check
```bash
# Find PDA usage
rg "find_program_address|create_program_address" programs/
rg "seeds.*bump" programs/
# Anchor: Check for seeds constraints
rg "#\[account.*seeds" programs/
```
For each PDA:
- [ ] Uses `find_program_address()` or Anchor `seeds` constraint
- [ ] Bump seed stored and reused
- [ ] Not using user-provided bump
### Step 4: Account Validation Sweep
```bash
# Find account deserialization
rg "try_from_slice|try_deserialize" programs/
# Should see owner checks before deserialization
rg "\.owner\s*==|\.owner\s*!=" programs/
```
For each account used:
- [ ] Owner validated before deserialization
- [ ] Signer check for authority accounts
- [ ] Anchor: Uses `Account<'info, T>` and `Signer<'info>`
### Step 5: Instruction Introspection Review
```bash
# Find instruction introspection usage
rg "load_instruction_at|load_current_index|get_instruction_relative" programs/
# Check for checked versions
rg "load_instruction_at_checked|load_current_index_checked" programs/
```
- [ ] Using checked functions (Solana 1.8.1+)
- [ ] Using relative indexing
- [ ] Proper correlation validation
### Step 6: Trail of Bits Solana Lints
```toml
# Add to Cargo.toml
[dependencies]
solana-program = "1.17" # Use latest version
[lints.clippy]
# Enable Solana-specific lints
# (Trail of Bits solana-lints if available)
```
---
## 8. Reporting Format
### Finding Template
````markdown
## [CRITICAL] Arbitrary CPI - Unchecked Program ID
**Location**: `programs/vault/src/lib.rs:145-160` (withdraw function)
**Description**:
The `withdraw` function performs a CPI to transfer SPL tokens without validating that the provided `token_program` account is actually the SPL Token program. An attacker can provide a malicious program that appears to perform a transfer but actually steals tokens or performs unauthorized actions.
**Vulnerable Code**:
```rust
// lib.rs, line 145
pub fn withdraw(ctx: Context<Withdraw>, amount: u64) -> Result<()> {
let token_program = &ctx.accounts.token_program;
// WRONG: No validation of token_program.key()!
invoke(
&spl_token::instruction::transfer(...),
&[
ctx.accounts.vault.to_account_info(),
ctx.accounts.destination.to_account_info(),
ctx.accounts.authority.to_account_info(),
token_program.to_account_info(), // UNVALIDATED
],
)?;
Ok(())
}
```
**Attack Scenario**:
1. Attacker deploys malicious "token program" that logs transfer instruction but doesn't execute it
2. Attacker calls withdraw() providing malicious program as token_program
3. Vault's authority signs the transaction
4. Malicious program receives CPI with vault's signature
5. Malicious program can now impersonate vault and drain real tokens
**Recommendation**:
Use Anchor's `Program<'info, Token>` type:
```rust
use anchor_spl::token::{Token, Transfer};
#[derive(Accounts)]
pub struct Withdraw<'info> {
#[account(mut)]
pub vault: Account<'info, TokenAccount>,
#[account(mut)]
pub destination: Account<'info, TokenAccount>,
pub authority: Signer<'info>,
pub token_program: Program<'info, Token>, // Validates program ID automatically
}
pub fn withdraw(ctx: Context<Withdraw>, amount: u64) -> Result<()> {
let cpi_accounts = Transfer {
from: ctx.accounts.vault.to_account_info(),
to: ctx.accounts.destination.to_account_info(),
authority: ctx.accounts.authority.to_account_info(),
};
let cpi_ctx = CpiContext::new(
ctx.accounts.token_program.to_account_info(),
cpi_accounts,
);
anchor_spl::token::transfer(cpi_ctx, amount)?;
Ok(())
}
```
**References**:
- building-secure-contracts/not-so-smart-contracts/solana/arbitrary_cpi
- Trail of Bits lint: `unchecked-cpi-program-id`
````
---
## 9. Priority Guidelines
### Critical (Immediate Fix Required)
- Arbitrary CPI (attacker-controlled program execution)
- Improper PDA validation (account spoofing)
- Missing signer check (unauthorized access)
### High (Fix Before Launch)
- Missing ownership check (fake account data)
- Sysvar account check (authentication bypass, pre-1.8.1)
### Medium (Address in Audit)
- Improper instruction introspection (logic bypass)
---
## 10. Testing Recommendations
### Unit Tests
```rust
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
#[should_panic]
fn test_rejects_wrong_program_id() {
// Provide wrong program ID, should fail
}
#[test]
#[should_panic]
fn test_rejects_non_canonical_pda() {
// Provide non-canonical bump, should fail
}
#[test]
#[should_panic]
fn test_requires_signer() {
// Call without signature, should fail
}
}
```
### Integration Tests (Anchor)
```typescript
import * as anchor from "@coral-xyz/anchor";
describe("security tests", () => {
it("rejects arbitrary CPI", async () => {
const fakeTokenProgram = anchor.web3.Keypair.generate();
try {
await program.methods
.withdraw(amount)
.accounts({
tokenProgram: fakeTokenProgram.publicKey, // Wrong program
})
.rpc();
assert.fail("Should have rejected fake program");
} catch (err) {
// Expected to fail
}
});
});
```
### Solana Test Validator
```bash
# Run local validator for testing
solana-test-validator
# Deploy and test program
anchor test
```
---
## 11. Additional Resources
- **Building Secure Contracts**: `building-secure-contracts/not-so-smart-contracts/solana/`
- **Trail of Bits Solana Lints**: https://github.com/trailofbits/solana-lints
- **Anchor Documentation**: https://www.anchor-lang.com/
- **Solana Program Library**: https://github.com/solana-labs/solana-program-library
- **Solana Cookbook**: https://solanacookbook.com/
---
## 12. Quick Reference Checklist
Before completing Solana program audit:
**CPI Security (CRITICAL)**:
- [ ] ALL CPI calls validate program ID before `invoke()`
- [ ] Cannot use user-provided program accounts
- [ ] Anchor: Uses `Program<'info, T>` type
**PDA Security (CRITICAL)**:
- [ ] PDAs use `find_program_address()` or Anchor `seeds` constraint
- [ ] Bump seed stored and reused (not user-provided)
- [ ] PDA accounts validated against canonical address
**Account Validation (HIGH)**:
- [ ] ALL accounts check owner before deserialization
- [ ] Native: Validates `account.owner == expected_program_id`
- [ ] Anchor: Uses `Account<'info, T>` type
**Signer Validation (CRITICAL)**:
- [ ] ALL authority accounts check `is_signer`
- [ ] Native: Validates `account.is_signer == true`
- [ ] Anchor: Uses `Signer<'info>` type
**Sysvar Security (HIGH)**:
- [ ] Using Solana 1.8.1+
- [ ] Using checked functions: `load_instruction_at_checked()`
- [ ] Sysvar addresses validated
**Instruction Introspection (MEDIUM)**:
- [ ] Using relative indexes for correlation
- [ ] Proper validation between related instructions
- [ ] Cannot reuse same instruction across multiple calls
**Testing**:
- [ ] Unit tests cover all account validation
- [ ] Integration tests with malicious inputs
- [ ] Local validator testing completed
- [ ] Trail of Bits lints enabled and passing
章节与文件索引
按说明文件中的顺序排列。
1. 目的
2. 何时使用此技能
文件扩展名和指示符
项目结构
工具支持
文件/命令 -> .rs · programs/*/src/lib.rs · Anchor.toml · Cargo.toml · solana-program · anchor-lang · tests/ · Program<'info, T>
内容校验值 -> 34ef10b753b8
当前原文的自动摘译,尚未人工审校。
1. 目的
系统地扫描 Solana 程序(本机和 Anchor 框架),以查找与跨程序调用、帐户验证和程序派生地址相关的特定于平台的安全漏洞。该技能编码了 Solana 账户模型特有的 6 种关键漏洞模式。
2. 何时使用此技能
审核 Solana 程序(本机 Rust 或 Anchor) 检查跨程序调用 (CPI) 逻辑 验证程序派生地址 (PDA) 实现 Solana 协议的预启动安全评估 检查帐户验证模式
文件扩展名和指示符
Rust 文件:
.rs项目结构
programs/*/src/lib.rs- 程序实施Anchor.toml- 锚点配置Cargo.toml与solana-program或anchor-langtests/- 程序测试工具支持
Trail of Bits Solana Lints:用于 Solana 安装的 Rust linters:添加到 Cargo.toml 锚点测试:内置测试框架 Solana 测试验证器:本地测试环境