漏洞分类布卡
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- 作者更新于 2026年8月24日 23:09
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- 网络行为
- 仅限本地
- 安装命令数
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需要注意: 未声明工具权限范围;实际权限由运行环境决定。
# Vulnerability Triage Brocards
Systematically evaluate incoming vulnerability reports against 7 principled
criteria before committing resources to deeper analysis. Each brocard is a
falsifiable test: if a report fails any brocard, document the reason and
dismiss or request clarification. If a report survives all 7, escalate it.
The 7 brocards are adapted from William Woodruff's
["Brocards for vulnerability triage"](https://blog.yossarian.net/2026/04/11/Brocards-for-vulnerability-triage)
(2026).
## When to Use
- Filtering findings from agentic vulnerability discovery pipelines
before human review -- the primary use case; most automated runs
produce findings that fail one or more brocards and can be dismissed
without auditor time
- Triaging findings during a ToB audit to decide which warrant
escalation to PoC development
- Evaluating third-party CVEs or advisories against a codebase under
active audit to decide if they affect engagement scope
- Reviewing bug bounty submissions or external vulnerability reports
for ToB open-source projects
- Providing structured, defensible justification when recommending a
client dismiss or deprioritize a reported CVE
## When NOT to Use
- **Hunting for new bugs during an audit** -- use other skills
- **Proving exploitability of a confirmed finding** -- use a
dedicated PoC/exploitability skill
- **Triaging fuzzer crashes in C/C++** -- use a dedicated crash
triage skill
## Pipeline Position
This skill is the quality gate between automated discovery and human
review. Findings that survive triage proceed to PoC development and
formal writeup.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
A([agentic vulnerability discovery]) -->|raw findings| B[vulnerability-triage-brocards]
B -->|DISMISS| C([Document brocard # and reasoning])
B -->|NEEDS-MORE-INFO| D([Request specific evidence])
B -->|ACCEPT| E[PoC / exploitability proof]
E --> F[vulnerability report writeup]
```
## Triage Workflow
For each incoming vulnerability report, evaluate it against all 7 brocards
sequentially. By default, stop at the first DISMISS verdict and report it.
If the user requests a full evaluation, continue through all 7 brocards
regardless of intermediate failures. For each brocard, record one of three
verdicts:
- **PASS** -- the report survives this test
- **DISMISS** -- the report fails this test; document the reason
- **NEEDS-MORE-INFO** -- insufficient evidence to evaluate; specify what is
missing
### Brocard 1: No Vulnerability Without a Threat Model
Dismiss any report that lacks a coherent threat model. The report must
articulate: (a) who the attacker is, (b) what capability the attacker has,
(c) how the attacker exploits the behavior, and (d) what harm results.
Reports that describe a code behavior without connecting it to attacker-
reachable harm fail this brocard.
**Quick test:** Can the report answer "an attacker with [capability] can
[action] to achieve [impact]"? If not, dismiss or request clarification.
### Brocard 2: No Exploit from the Heavens
Dismiss any report where the attacker capabilities required to trigger the
vulnerability equal or exceed the impact of the vulnerability itself. If the
attacker must already possess the power the exploit would grant, the
vulnerability is redundant.
**Quick test:** Does triggering the exploit require capabilities that already
subsume its impact? If yes, dismiss.
### Brocard 3: No Vulnerability Outside of Usage
Dismiss any report describing behavior that is theoretically possible but
does not occur in actual software usage. Check whether the vulnerable code
path is reachable in practice.
**Quick test:** Is the vulnerable code path exercised by any real caller?
If not, dismiss. If the report targets a library, ask if we should check
downstream usage.
### Brocard 4: No Vulnerability from Standard Behavior
Dismiss any report where the behavior results from correct implementation of
a specification. The vulnerability, if any, exists in the standard -- not the
implementation.
**Nuance:** If an implementation voluntarily adopts a stricter posture than
the standard requires, and that strictness fails, the implementation *is*
vulnerable even though the standard permits the behavior.
**Quick test:** Does the specification require or permit this behavior? If
yes, the report targets the standard, not the code.
### Brocard 5: No Vulnerability from Documented Behavior
Dismiss any report describing behavior that is explicitly documented,
especially when the documentation includes security implications or usage
caveats.
**Nuance:** Downstream usage that violates documented guidelines may
constitute a valid vulnerability in the *downstream* project, not the
documented component.
**Quick test:** Does the project's documentation describe this behavior and
warn against misuse? If yes, dismiss the report against the project itself.
### Brocard 6: No Cure Worse Than the Disease
Dismiss any report whose remediation would cause more harm than the
vulnerability itself. Evaluate: (a) severity of the vulnerability in
practice, (b) cost and disruption of the proposed fix, (c) blast radius of
the remediation (dependency graph, ecosystem impact).
**Quick test:** Would fixing this cause more disruption than the
vulnerability itself? If yes, dismiss or downgrade severity.
### Brocard 7: The Report Is Neither Necessary nor Sufficient
A CVE identifier or formal report does not prove a vulnerability exists.
Conversely, absence of a report does not prove safety. Evaluate the
technical merits independently of report metadata.
**Quick test:** Strip the CVE number and CVSS score. Does the technical
description alone justify action? Judge on evidence, not authority.
## Output Format
After evaluating all 7 brocards, produce a structured triage summary:
```
## Triage Summary: [Report ID or Title]
| # | Brocard | Verdict | Rationale |
|---|---------|---------|-----------|
| 1 | Threat Model | PASS/DISMISS/NEEDS-MORE-INFO | ... |
| 2 | Exploit from the Heavens | PASS/DISMISS/NEEDS-MORE-INFO | ... |
| 3 | Outside of Usage | PASS/DISMISS/NEEDS-MORE-INFO | ... |
| 4 | Standard Behavior | PASS/DISMISS/NEEDS-MORE-INFO | ... |
| 5 | Documented Behavior | PASS/DISMISS/NEEDS-MORE-INFO | ... |
| 6 | Cure Worse Than Disease | PASS/DISMISS/NEEDS-MORE-INFO | ... |
| 7 | Report Sufficiency | PASS/DISMISS/NEEDS-MORE-INFO | ... |
**Overall Verdict:** ACCEPT / DISMISS / NEEDS-MORE-INFO
**Reasoning:** [1-3 sentence justification]
**Next Step:** [escalate to PoC development / request info / close]
```
## Rationalizations to Reject
Guard against these reasoning failures in both directions:
### Wrongly Dismissing Valid Findings
- "It's only reachable in debug mode" -- verify debug mode is truly
never enabled in production; many clients ship with debug flags on
- "The attacker would need local access" -- local access is a realistic
threat model for many deployments, especially containerized services
- "Nobody uses that API" -- confirm with actual usage data, not
assumptions; check client's integration tests and deployment configs
- "The spec allows it" -- check whether the implementation claims
stricter behavior than the spec requires
### Wrongly Accepting Invalid Findings
- "It has a CVE, so it must be real" -- Brocard 7 exists for this reason
- "The CVSS score is high" -- CVSS is a formula, not a verdict
- "Better safe than sorry" -- Brocard 6 requires evaluating fix cost
- "We can't prove it's NOT exploitable" -- the burden of proof is on the
reporter to demonstrate a threat model (Brocard 1)
- "Other projects patched it" -- other projects may have different usage
patterns (Brocard 3)
- "We should include it to pad the report" -- ToB reports reflect
technical reality, not finding count targets; a dismissed report with
documented reasoning is more valuable than a false positive in a
final deliverable
## Detailed References
For expanded explanations, examples, and edge cases for each brocard, consult
[`references/brocards-detail.md`](references/brocards-detail.md).
章节与文件索引
按说明文件中的顺序排列。
何时使用
何时不使用
管道位置
分诊工作流程
Brocard 1:没有威胁模型就没有漏洞
文件/命令 -> references/brocards-detail.md · blog.yossarian.net/2026/04/11/Brocards-for-vulnerability-triage · PoC/exploitability · C/C · PASS/DISMISS/NEEDS-MORE-INFO
内容校验值 -> ccf69fdc1eaf
当前原文的自动摘译,尚未人工审校。
何时使用
在人工审查之前从代理漏洞发现管道中过滤结果——主要用例;大多数自动化运行都会产生无法通过一个或多个 Brocard 的结果,并且可以在没有审核员时间的情况下被驳回 在 ToB 审核期间对结果进行分类,以决定哪个依据
何时不使用
在审计期间寻找新错误 - 使用其他技能 证明已确认发现的可利用性 - 使用专用的 PoC/可利用性技能 在 C/C++ 中对模糊器崩溃进行分类 - 使用专用的崩溃分类技能
管道位置
这项技能是自动发现和人工审查之间的质量关。分类后的结果将继续进行 PoC 开发和正式撰写。
分诊工作流程
对于每个传入的漏洞报告,请依次对照所有 7 个 Brocard 对其进行评估。默认情况下,在第一个 DISMISS 判决处停止并报告。如果用户请求进行全面评估,请继续完成所有 7 个 Brocard,无论中间是否出现故障。对于每张布卡,记录以下三个结论之一:
Brocard 1:没有威胁模型就没有漏洞
驳回任何缺乏连贯威胁模型的报告。报告必须阐明:(a) 攻击者是谁,(b) 攻击者具有什么能力,(c) 攻击者如何利用该行为,以及 (d) 造成什么危害。描述代码行为但未将其与攻击者可达到的危害联系起来的报告将失败。